

**01021**

**1962/11/03**

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EYES ONLY

DRAFT INSTRUCTION TO USUN  
FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Submitted 11/2/62

CUTL 57-11  
21

CUBA: INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS

We do not yet know whether Cuba will be willing voluntarily to have international inspection on his soil, either to verify dismantling and removal of offensive weapons or to assure such weapons do not later reappear. However, Mikoyan visit could conceivably soften Cuban policy on this point. Moreover, door is not necessarily closed to some agreed form of inspection provided it is not limited to Cuba but covers a broader area. We understand SYG had impression Castro found interesting SYG's argument that US presence in Cuba in itself constituted deterrent to invasion of Cuba.

On these assumptions, following are procedures that are being considered after general review of the matter here.

1. PHASE I (now).

Hopefully we can quickly implement ICRC arrangement operating from vessels outside three-mile limit. This inspection of incoming vessels would make possible suspension of enforcement of quarantine, but U.S. ships would stay on station. ICRC, operating as agent of SYG, would continue until full verification of dismantling and removal made it possible for U.S. to lift quarantine altogether. At that point, ICRC arrangement presumably would lapse.

2. PHASE II (beginning when Soviets say the offensive weapons are out of Cuba and ending with Security Council confirmation.) There are two alternatives for inspection, depending on whether Cuba acquiesces in inspection procedures or not.

a. If

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Washington Nat'l Records Center, RG-330,  
OASD (C) A File: FRC 71A2896  
Verification of US-USSR Agreements  
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a. If Cuba does not acquiesce, we would:

- (1) Call a meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States, acting as its Organ of Consultation, to pass a resolution explicitly recommending to OAS members that "pending the establishment of adequate arrangements for surveillance and inspection under the auspices of the United Nations . . . there be undertaken such aerial and other appropriate surveillance of Cuba as may be necessary to assure that all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability are dismantled and withdrawn from Cuba, and that such weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba." This would provide an OAS umbrella for the comprehensive air reconnaissance which will be required in absence ground inspection to give OAS members, including U.S., some reasonable assurance that Soviets have in fact removed weapons from Cuba and also give a sanction for continued air surveillance if no other measures are devised to give continued assurance against their reintroduction.
- (2) Upon completion of removal of the weapons, the Secretary General would make a report to the Security Council, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., make declarations on what has been done to carry out commitments contained in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters, and the Security Council President would sum up what has been said in a consensus statement. This procedure and the statements would of course have to be negotiated in advance with the Soviet Union. This procedure would not involve any Security Council Resolution.

b. If

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b. If Cuba does acquiesce:

(1) USMC would, with Security Council authorization, place in Cuba a UN presence to conduct ground inspection along lines of general negotiating instructions (paragraph 6 of Department's 11/17). As indicated in those instructions, systematic aerial reconnaissance would be necessary part of process in this period, and we should encourage SIG to develop capability to do all or part of necessary aerial surveillance.

(2) Upon satisfactory completion of such UN inspection, there would be a meeting of the Security Council at which the Council would take note of the SIG's report that offensive weapons had been removed from Cuba, and the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would make complementary declarations. It would probably be necessary that the U.S. declaration make reference to a prior OAS action with respect to "invasion".

3. PHASE III. (This phase would begin with the completion of Security Council action confirming the removal of the weapons from Cuba and would continue through whatever period Cuba may be dominated by a Communist Government.) There appear to be two alternatives for continued inspection during this period to assure that the weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba:

a. If Cuba does not acquiesce it would be possible under the OAS resolution mentioned in paragraph 2 to continue the aerial surveillance program.

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b.

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4.

- b. If Cuba does acquiesce it should be possible to provide an arrangement under the Brazilian Latin American Denuclearized Zone proposal which is now in the General Assembly to establish a system of inspection covering all of Latin America, including Cuba.

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